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ABSTRACT
The Reference Design Document, Volume III Part 1, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis
Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the
nuclear safety analysis of the Reactor Power Module as applied to a Space Base program.
A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations,
as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included.
Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the
nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the
500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the
power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for
boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.
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FOREWORD
The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research.
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications.
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those of
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.,
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
Table A. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety Documentation
Volume
I
Part 1
Part 2
II
Part 1
Part 1A
m
Part 1
Part 2
Part 2 A
Part 3
IV
Part 1
Part 2
__V
Part 1
Part 2
VI
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Part 1
Part 2
Executive Summary
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Space Base Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear Safety Analysis (PSAR)
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Reactor System Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Reference Design Document (RDD)
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Document No.
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VI
This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System presents a comprehensive
assessment of public and ecological safety of the Zirconium-Hydride (ZrH) Brayton Cycle
Reactor Electrical Power System as applied to a Space Base Program. The reference
power system was derived from the Phase A Space Base studies recently performed for
NASA by MDAC and NAR (References 1-1 and 1-2).
The PSAR is presented in three separate documents as follows:
Volume in, Part 1 - Reference Design Document (RDD)
Volume HI, Part 2 - Accident Model Document (AMD)
Volume HI, Part 3 - Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
Figure 1-1 illustrates the basic logic and structure of the PSAR.
This document, the RDD, contains a description of the ZrH Reactor Electrical Power System
(EPS), related hardware, and mission and operational data to provide all pertinent design
information and required performance of the nuclear safety analysis. Every effort has been
made to present only that information considered germane to the analysis.
The other two documents in the series serve: (1) to identify and estimate the possibility of
occurrence of potential mission-related failure modes and sequences which can lead to public
nuclear safety hazards (Part II AMD); (2) to describe the radiological consequences that could
result from the failures and present design and/or operational features that could minimize
or eliminate the potential hazards (Part III, NSAD).
The analysis performed in this PSAR is concerned with public rather than crew safety. The
potential hazards imposed by the reactor power modules on the crew are presented in Volume
II, PSAR-Space Base.
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The Space Base reference design ZrH power module employs a Brayton cycle conversion
system. It is expected that the application of other conversion systems with different manned
spacecraft configurations should not significantly affect the results and overall conclusions
of the study. The changes which may result (failure modes, probabilities and modified
source terms) can be rather easily factored into the analysis and the relative effects deter-
mined. Therefore, the results of this study can serve as a point of departure for the nuclear
safety analysis of reactor powerplants on future manned space missions.
PART 1
(RDD)
REFERENCE
DESIGN DOCUMENT
PART 2
(AMD)
ACCIDENT
MODEL DOCUMENT
ACCIDENT DEFINITION
SEQUENCE TREES
FUNCTIONAL REQUIRE-
MENTS
PART 3
(NSAD)
NUCLEAR SAFETY
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MAGNITUDE AND PROBABILITY
OF NUCLEAR HAZARD
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Figure 1-1. PSAR Logic
REFERENCES
1-1 "Space Base Concept Data, " Volume I-VIII, MDC-G0576, McDonnell Douglas,
June 1970.
1-2 "Space Base Definition, " Volume I-IE, MSC-00721 (SD70-160), North American
Rockwell, July 1970.
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SECTION 2
NUCLEAR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
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SECTION 2
NUCLEAR E L E C T R I C A L POWER SYSTEM
Electrical power requirements for the Space Base are supplied by two independent, ZrH
reactor power modules providing a total of 100 kWe as illustrated in Figure 2-1. The base-
line design is that specified by MDAC in recent Space Base Phase A studies (Reference 2-1).
To supply this net power, each reactor in the Electrical Power System (EPS) is rated at
600 kWt but normally operates at 330 kWt. Each reactor is coupled to three Brayton cycle
power conversion systems - one operating and two on stand-by, as shown in Figure 2-2.
During normal operation, one Brayton unit delivers 50 kW of net electrical power. Nominal
operating life of each Brayton unit is assumed to be 2. 5 years whereas reactor lifetimes are
assumed to be 5 years.
The EPS is divided into four major subsystems as illustrated in the simplified schematic
(Figure 2-2).
1. Reactor Primary NaK Loop
2. Reactor Intermediate NaK Loop
3. Brayton Gas Power Conversion Loop
4. Brayton Heat Rejection Loop
A summary of the key reactor Brayton system characteristics is given in Table 2-1. The
mass distribution within one reactor power module (EPS plus reactor system) is presented
in Table 2-2.
2.1 REACTOR PRIMARY NaK LOOP
The Primary NaK Loop transfers the heat from the reactor to the NaK-to-NaK heat exchanger
located in the gallery on the opposite side of the Space Base interface. This allows the reac-
tor shield to be placed between the activated NaK inventory and the Space Base, thus reducing
the overall radiation levels to the Space Base and to the power conversion system components.
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Table 2-1. ZrH Reactor Brayton System Characteristics
(Each of Two-50 kWe Sources)
EPS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
PCS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Radiator
1.
2.
3.
. 4. .
5.
6.
Net conditioned output power (kWe)
Conditioning and distribution losses (kWe)
Parasitic pumping and control losses (kWe)
Gross raw power rating (kWe)
Installed PCS modules (active/standby)
PCS design wearout life goal (yr)
Reactor thermal power (kWt)
Prime radiator heat rejection (kWt)
Auxiliary (low-temperature) radiator rejection (kWt)
Radiator area (prime)
Radiator area (auxiliary)
Average system life (yr)
Reactor temperature (inlet/outlet)
Conversion efficiency (%)
Working gas
Turbine inlet temperature
Compressor inlet temperature
Shaft speed/frequency (rpm/Hz)
Cycle heat input (kWt)
Cycle efficiency (%)
Turbine inlet pressure
Recuperator effectiveness
Pressure loss factor (/?)
Compressor/turbine efficiency (%)
Compressor/turbine pressure ratios
(Prime)
Coating
Coating a/e
Sink temperature
Fluid
Number of active/standby lpops__
Inlet/outlet temperature
International
Units
50.0
8.2
JL^l
66
1/2
2.5
330
253
17.6
242m
18.6m2
5
860/945°K
17.7
Xe/He
895°K
369°K
24000/400
310
21.3
99. 4xl04N/m2
0.92
0. 96
85.6/90.0
1.74/1.67
Z-93
0.25
244°K
NaK
1/2--— r-
475/355 K
English
Units
2400 ft2
220 ft2
1090/1240°F
1,150°F
205°F
144. 4 psia
-20°F
398/180°F
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Table 2-2. Reactor/Brayton System Mass
Item
Reactor
Primary loop
Shield (non-optimized)
Intermediate loop
Power conversion systems (3)
Turbine-alternator-compressor
Heat source heat exchanger
Recuperator
Heat sink heat exchanger
Miscellaneous
Total (each)
Electrical/electronics (3)
Heat rejection loop
Radiator/radiator structure
Structural cone and mounting brackets
Thermal shroud, tracks, and actuators
Docking equipment
Disposal propulsion (15%)
Subtotal
Contingency (10%)
Total
Mass (kg)
830
297
18,413
340
1,848
198
91
122
54
151
616
671
268
1,700
454
590
136
3,830
29,377
2,938
32, 315
Mass (Ib)
1,830
655
40,600
750
4, 074
437
201
268
118
334
1,358
1,479
592
3,750
1,000
1,300
300
8,450
64,780
6,478
71,258
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The primary loop flow is supplied by redundant thermoelectric powered electromagnetic
(TEM) pumps which derive power by diverting 7. 4 kWt from the loop flow. A description of
the reference design ZrH reactor is contained in Section 2.5.
2.2 REACTOR INTERMEDIATE NaK LOOP
The Intermediate NaK Loop transfers the heat from the primary loop to the Brayton Power
Conversion Loop via a NaK-to-gas (Xe/He) heat exchanger located in the Power Conversion
System (PCS) module. The intermediate loop also employs redundant TEM pumps to cir-
culate the NaK through the loop. These pumps also divert power from the loop (9. 2 kWt) as
its source of energy. The standby PCS units are valved out of the loop to reduce pumping
power requirements.
2.3 BRAYTON GAS POWER CONVERSION LOOP
The Power Conversion Loop, referred to as the Brayton PCS, contains five major components:
1. Heat Source Heat Exchanger
2. Brayton Rotating Unit - (Turbine-Alternator-Compressor)
3. Recuperator
4. Gas Management System
5. Waste Heat - Heat Exchanger
The reference Brayton Rotating Unit (BRU) consists of a single-stage radial turbine, a two-
pole Rice alternator and a single stage radial compressor mounted on a common shaft rota-
ting at 24, 000 rpm. The BRU with hydrodynamically operating bearings and other compon-
ents are to be capable of zero g to 3 g operation in any orientation. The working gas of the
-BRU-is-an-Xe/He-mixture wi1h-a"turbine"in^leTtem^eliature'of~895oK^(rr50oF)^ A relatively
high temperature (approximately 900°K) NaK-to-gas heat exchanger is employed in the up-
stream end of the PCS and a low temperature (approximately 500°K) gas-to-NaK heat ex-
changer is used to supply waste heat to the radiator. Each PCS heat rejection system is
designed such that its heat rejection loop is hydraulically independent of each other. Typical
2-6
system flow as shown in Figure 2-2 is Xe/He from the NaK-gas heat exchanger to the turbine
from which the waste heat is ducted to the recuperator then to the waste heat-heat exchanger
and then to the compressor inlet. The compressed Xe/He mixture from the compressor dis-
charge then flows through the recuperator and back to the gas-to-NaK heat exchanger.
Load control of the PCS is accomplished with the plant furnishing average power equal to the
average primary bus load and then utilizing a battery/inverter to furnish peak power and ab-
sorb excess power. The constant power level approach results in a simple control system
with only a small part of the components actually active during normal operation. The ref-
erence Gas Management System (Reference 2-2) is shown in Figure 2-3 and contains all
mechanisms required to meter and cycle working fluid for pressure adjustment and leakage
makeup. The voltage and frequency controls are the only continuously modulating compon-
ents in the system. The other components remain unpowered except to compensate for leak-
age and to provide shutdown and startup functions.
SOLENOID
VALVE
FILL
VALVE
HIGH PRESS.
SOLENOID VALVE
PNEU. PRESS.
REGULATOR
HIGH PRESS.
SOLENOID VALVE
TO SPACE
VENT SOLENOID
VALVES
Figure 2-3. Gas Management System Schematic
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Power, generated by the PCS units, is paralleled at the source buses to load centers
throughout the Space Base (Figure 2-4).
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2. 4 BRAYTON HEAT REJECTION LOOP
Waste heat is rejected from the power conversion loop to the heat rejection loop via a waste
heat (gas-to-NaK) heat exchanger. Each PCS heat rejection system is designed such that its
heat rejection loop is hydraulically independent of each other. Each PCS is designed with
its own waste - heat exchanger, independent piping loop, and 400 Hz motor driven cen-
trifugal pump. The radiator is 6.6 m (260 in.) in diameter and 11. 7 m (38.4 ft) in length
2 _ 2
resulting in~a total-radiator "arealSf'242^1 (2"600~ft ) for a 50 kWe net unit. Each of the
three PCS' has its own loop on the radiator on a common fin sharing basis. The radiator
is equipped with a retractable shroud to prevent freezing of the NaK during non-operational
periods of the PCS. Cooling the alternator and electronic accessories located in the power
2 2
conversion system is accomplished by utilizing an 18.6 m (200 ft auxiliary radiator.
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The EPS radiator serves multi-functional purposes. The PCS' are located within the radia-
tor as is the shielded reactor. Rendezvous equipment and docking adaptors are provided at
both ends of the power module including attachments at the reactor-shield interface.
The radiator in its present concept, is also attached to a disposal system capable of boosting
the entire power module into a long life orbit. Design details on this system are presented in
Section 3.
2. 5 ZIRCONIUM HYDRIDE REACTOR
The reference zirconium hydride reactor situated inside the outer end of the radiator is
designed to operate over a wide range of temperature and power levels and is completely
surrounded by shielding. The reactor consists of three major subassemblies; the core,
vessel, and reflector assemblies. A cutaway view of the reactor is shown in Figure 2-5
and some of its key design features are shown in Table 2-3.
2. 5.1 REACTOR CORE
The reactor core consists of a triangular pitch array of 295 fuel elements and has a 0. 29m
(11. 4 in.) diameter.
The fuel elements (Figure 2-6) consist of an alloy of 10. 5 wt% fully enriched uranium in
zirconium which is massively hydrided to provide neutron moderation. The hydrogen con-
22 3
tent of the fuel is 6.3 x 10 atoms/cm which is about the same as the hydrogen content in
cold water. The fuel elements are contained within 0. 38 mm (0. 015 in.) thick nickel alloy
cladding tubes which protect them from the NaK coolant and contain the fission products and
hydrogen moderator. Because of the significant permeation rate of hydrogen through the
bare cladding, a thin glass barrier is fused to the inside of the cladding tubes. Small clear-
ances are provided between the fuel element and cladding to allow for radiation-induced
growth of the fuel. The fuel elements have a helical fin to encourage coolant channel mix-
ing, to reduce fuel element bowing, to lower adjoining fuel element contact stresses, and to
minimize coolant flow channel area changes between the elements. Variable spacing is used
to furnish each element with coolant flow proportional to its generated power.
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Figure 2-5. Zirconium Hydride Reactor
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Table 2-3. Reference ZrH Reactor Design Data
Number of fuel elements
Fuel element length
Fuel element outside diameter
Clearance between fuel elements
Core diameter
Cladding material
Hydrogen barrier material
Fuel hydrogen content
Fuel material
Fuel uranium content
Fuel-to-clad gap width
Control-drum type
Number of active control drums
Control drum materials
Control drum diameter
Reactor vessel outside diameter
Reactor vessel height
Thermal power
Outlet temperature
Temperature rise
Reactor lifetime
Peak fuel temperature
Core burnable poison material
Peak control-drum temperature
Peak drum bearing temperature
Coolant
295
0.427m (16. 825 in.)
14.7 to 15.2 mm (0. 578 to
0.600 in.)
Variable
0.290m (11.40 in.)
Hastelloy N or Incoloy 800
SCB-1
22 H Atoms6.3 x 10 ~
o
cm
U-ZrH
10.67 percent
Variable
Reflector-poison
10
BeO/Ta-10 W
0.114m (4. 50 in.)
0.559m (22.00 in.)
0.744m (29. 30 in.)
330 kWt
945°K (1240°F)
~338°K (~150°F)
5 years
1044°K (1420°F)
Gd-155
1100°K (1520°F)
905°K (1350°F)
NaK-78
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Figure 2-6. Reference Fuel Element
2. 5. 2 REFLECTOR ASSEMBLY
The reflector assembly consists of the 10 neutron control drums, drive mechanisms, instru-
mentation and mounting structure uniformly spaced around the core assembly. Rotation of
the drums provides the degree of neutron leakage required to maintain the reactor operating
at desired levels. Each reactor control drum (Figure 2-7) is 0.114 m (4. 5 in.) in diameter
and 0. 457 m (18 in.) long. The drum consists of beryllium oxide (BeO) reflector mate-
rial fastened to a neutron-absorbing metal (Ta-lOW which also serves as the main
structural member. The drum is supported by self-aligning ball-and-socket-type bearings.
The control-drum shaft and the bearing socket are coated with flame-sprayed alumina which
provides a low-friction surface when in contact with the solid graphite ball. Drum rotation
is produced by a stepper motor operating through an integral 6:1 gear set (Figure 2-8). In
the fully shutdown position the gear teeth are dis-engaged by a cam lockout device to prevent
drum rotation due to launch acceleration. In addition to the moveable drums, fixed cylindri-
cal BeO reflectors are located between each of the reactor vessel dry wells for reactivity
enhancement.
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Figure 2-7. ZrH Reactor Control Drum and Bearings
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Figure 2-8. ZrH Reactor Control Drum Drive Train
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2.5.3 REACTOR VESSEL
All parts of the containment vessel and associated structure supporting the core and control
drums are Type 316 stainless steel. The NaK-78 coolant enters the lower vessel plenum at
860°K (1090°F) through four 38 mm (1.5 in.) inlet lines. The coolant flows upward in the
area between the control-drum drywells, turns 180°, flows downward through the upper grid
plate and the core, and exits from the core through the lower grid plate and then through the
outlet plenum at approximately 945°K (1240°F). A minor amount of heat is transferred be-
tween inlet and outlet coolant through the flow-dividing cylinder; thus the NaK mixed-mean
outlet temperature from the core is a few degrees hotter than the exiting temperature from
the vessel.
To obtain optimum fuel-element lifetime, it is necessary to compensate for the core cosine
radial power distribution by providing more coolant to the center of the core. This is ac-
complished by varying the spacing between fuel elements as a function of core radius. The
spacing between elements ranges from 1.14 mm (0.045 in.) in the core center to about 0.25
mm (0. 010 in.) at the edge. The irregular-shaped areas between the fuel-element array
and the cylindrical core are filled with solid type 316 stainless steel or clad BeO filler pieces
to prevent excessive coolant streaming. The inlet-to-outlet pressure drop of the reactor is
3 24.48x10 Newtons/m (0.65 psi) under nominal flow rate conditions.
2.5.4 REACTOR SHIELD
Adjacent to the pressure vessel is a 4?r gamma and neutron radiation shield which is arranged
as shown in Figure 2-9. At the top of the reactor assembly the sum of the individual layers
of tungsten and lithium hydride (LiH) approximates 0. 085 m (3. 35 in.) and 0. 560 m (22. 05 in.)
respectively. The widest portion of the shield, however, is at the bottom where 0.160 m
(6. 3 in.) of tungsten and 0. 790 m (31.1 in.) of lithium hydride are required. The exterior
shield clad is stainless steel.
2. 5. 5 REACTOR NUCLEAR CHARACTERISTICS
The response of a reactor to accident situations is intimately related to its nuclear charac-
teristics. These characteristics have not as yet been fully specified for the reference ZrH
reactor. Reactor performance and control data assumed for this study are shown in Tables
2-4 and 2-5 (Reference 2-3).
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Figure 2-9. Reactor-Shield Combination
As nuclear operation proceeds, reactivity losses occur due to uranium burnup, fission pro-
duct accumulation, and hydrogen loss from the fuel elements. A pre-poison (Gd-155) is
used in the core to reduce the reactivity variation during the planned lifetime and reduce the
control required by the control drums. The selected isotopes of the rare earth gadolinium
in oxide form are applied by vapor deposition to the outer surface of the fuel rod to provide
the necessary poisoning. The neutron absorption cross section (poison effectiveness) of the
gadolinium is reduced through neutron capture during operation and provides the desired re-
activity compensation. Reactivity and shutdown margins are important factors in reactor
lifetime, control and safety of operation.
Table 2-5 shows that at the most reactive time in core life (after the period when pre-poison
burnout overcompensates for reactivity losses) the reactor can be shut down with a comfort-
able margin even with one drum stuck in the most reactive position; yet enough reactivity
can be added to maintain full-power operation if one drum sticks in the least reactive position.
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Table 2-4. Typical Reactivity Summary
(330 kWt, 922°K (1200°F) Outlet, 5 yr)
CoU Clean Excess Reactivity Available
$9, Gd-155/$3, Eu-151 Prepolson Loading -12.00
Cold Excess Reactivity at Launch
Temperature defect. - 2.50
Power defect - 0.20
Xe-135 formation - 0.70
Core hydrogen redistribution - 0.25
Initial Operating Excess Reactivity
Hydrogen leakage - 2.40
Fuel burnup and fission-product - 6.79
accumulation
Sm-149 formation - 1.03
Burnout of Gd-155/Ku-151 +10. 51
Excess Reactivity After 5 yr
Temperature defect + 2. 50
Power defect + 0 . 2 0
Xe-135 decay + 0 . 7 0
Hydrogen Redistribution +0 .25
Cold Excess Reactivity at 5 yr
$17.65
5.65
2.00
2.29
5.94
Note: Reactivity is a measure of the actual or potential neutron multiplication factor in a
reactor; and therefore, the rate at which its power increases (or decreases). The reac-
tivity of a reactor at steady state power (including zero power) is equal to zero. Not all
neutrons emitted from fissioning fissile isotopes are emitted promptly at the instant of
fission. Some are delayed, up to 55.6 seconds for U-235. Reactivity is expressed in
multiple or fractions of dollars by the definition:
REACTIVITY = Pev^ati°n °f neutron multiplication from unity
Fraction of neutrons which are emitted as delayed neutrons
P =
excess (Dollars)
For U-235, 0.75 percent of the total neutrons are emitted as delayed neutrons (@ = 0. 0075).
Therefore, when the neutron multiplication factor is 1. 0075, a deviation from unity of
0. 0075, the reactivity, p, is equal to 0. 0075/0. 0075, unity. This condition is arbitrarily
defined as a positive reactivity of one dollar, although more or less reactivity may be in-
serted by control drum rotation. Reactivity is always positive when power increases, and
is always negative for power decreases.
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Table 2-5. Reactivity Control Characteristics
Reactivity Added by Control
Drums
Shutdown Margin (Cold)
Launch pad
Most reactive point in life
5yr
Excess Reactivity (1£QO°F;
600 kWt)
Beginning- of- life
5 yr
Temperature Coefficients
of Reactivity
Fuel temperature
Coolant inlet temperature
Coolant outlet temperature
Drums Out*
All
$0
- -4. 85
-2.76
-4.56
1 Stuck-In
$1.00
Not
applicable
-1.76
-3.56
Drums In*
1 Stuck-Out
$8.75
- - • • - • • - -
0.25
0.54
All
$10.50
2.00
2.29
-0.10^/°F
-0. 07^/°F
-0. 03^/°F
*The "out" position is least reactive (neutron absorber next to core).
Although reactivity loss is the ultimate life-limiting factor, two other associated life limits
have been identified: (1) normal irradiation-induced growth of the fuel; and (2) hydrogen loss
sufficient to cause phase transformation of the zirconium hydride. Transformation of the
fuel from the A to /3 phase is known to result in accelerated fuel growth. Sufficient clearance
is provided between the fuel and cladding to prevent contact due to normal irradiation growth
during the reactor lifetime. The larger this clearance, however, the higher the fuel tern-
perature which results in accelerated hydrogen loss and reduces the time to reach fuel-phase
transformation. The fuel-to-cladding clearance is therefore optimized to maximize the reac-
tor lifetime. Reactor lifetime operating at 330 kWt with an outlet temperature of 945°K
(1240 F) is predicted to be greater than 5 years.
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2.6 NaK-78 VOLUME/MASS
The volume and mass of the NaK in the EPS has been estimated and presented in Table 2-6.
Table 2-6. NaK Loop Volume and Mass
Primary Loop
Reactor
Intermediate Heat Exchanger
Piping & Pumps
-2AV = 8. 20x10 x 0. 162 =
Subtotal
Intermediate Loops
Brayton Heater
Intermediate Heat Exchanger
Piping & Pumps
AV = 13. 80 x 10~2 x 0. 162 -
Subtotal
Heat Rejection Loops
Radiator & Piping
AV = 9. 20 x 10~2 x 0. 0525 =
Subtotal
Total
Q
Volume-m
4. 60 x 10"2
1. 00 x 10~2
2. 60 x 10~2
8. 20 x 10-2
1.30
9.50x 10~2
(5790 in. 3)
0. 80 x 10~2
0.70 x!0~2
12.30 x 10"2
13. 80 x 10-2
2.20
16. 00 x 10~2
(9750 in.3)
9. 20 x 10"2
0.50
9.70x 10~2
(5900 in. 3)
35.20 x 10~2
(21440 in.3)
Mass (kg)
66
110
68
244
(Ibs)
(145)
(240)
(150)
(535)
2.7 REACTOR OPERATIONS
2. 7.1 PRESTART CONDITIONS
The reference reactor and radiator would be housed within a moveable shroud prior to
operation. The NaK-78 within the system freezes at approximately 250°K (10 F) and some
small amount of heating and circulation of the liquid metal would be required. As the system
comes up to power the shroud would be retracted and the radiator loops would come up to
operating temperature. 2-19
2.7.2 STARTUP
Startup is initiated by activating the instrumentation and control circuits while making a sys-
tems status check to assure readiness. When system readiness has been received the start-
up command is given, auxiliary pumping is started, and control drum stepping is subsequently
initiated. The sequence which follows is typically illustrated in Figure 2-10.
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Figure 2-10. Typical Reactor Brayton Startup Transient
During the first phase of start-up, control drums are stepped in sequence at 3-sec intervals
until they reach a preset drum position as indicated by the drum step counter. At this point
the drum-stepping period is increased to 150 seconds. The reactor is subsequently made
critical and undergoes a power-temperature transient. Pumping rates are increased at this
^point-and_the_ controljinim^steppjngjntervai is_jreduced from 15CLtp^O sejcci^ d .^_ T^e_reactpr^
power is allowed to be quasi-stable at about 10 percent nominal power while the NaK and
reactor temperatures increase. Drum stepping is continued until the reactor outlet temper-
atures reach approximately 945°K (1240°F), where the stepping is stopped and control is
turned over to a fixed temperature program.
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At this time, the Brayton unit can be started and brought up to speed. This is achieved by a
simultaneous motor start and bearing feed gas injection. The Brayton unit can obtain self-
sustaining operation with about 10 percent of the nominal gas pressure. After self-sustaining
speed is achieved, the Brayton unit can be brought up to rated power at a preselected rate by
increasing gas loop pressure. The condition shown in Figure 2-10 is considered a relatively
rapid start-up sequence. In this instance no reactor control action was taken wherein actual
operation reactivity would be removed when the reactor outlet temperature goes above the
dead band, resulting in a less severe power transient.
2.7.3 REACTOR OPERATION
During steady state operation, the reactor and Brayton controls are nearly independent.
The reactor control mechanism is initiated by reactor outlet temperature. Reactor temper-
ature is controlled with a dead-band of ± 10°K. The separate control of the BRU is by a mix-
ture of autonomous and remote control. The basic controlled variable is compressor dis-
charge pressure which is adjusted by periodic pulsing of bleed and makeup valves stimulated
by the dead-band controller.
The Brayton system is maintained at constant speed by means of an external parasitic load
resistor, proper output voltage by means of alternator excitation control, and proper BRU
loop power capacity by compressor discharge pressure control. Electrical output power
can be changed by the addition or removal of gas from the Brayton loop. The reactor tem-
perature controller then causes the reactor to adjust accordingly. Significant adjustments
in electrical power require relatively small adjustments in reactor operation.
Sudden unplanned stoppage of a Brayton unit causes the temperature of the reactor to rise
a few degrees and then return to normal. The coolant temperature difference approaches
zero, re suiting in an isothermal reactor. Malfunctions exist which can cause Brayton stop-
page or dangerous overspeed conditions resulting in destruction of the unit. Failure of the
parasitic load speed control would lead to dangerous overspeed. Alternator excitation failure
also results in an overspeed condition. An overspeed trip is an essential safety feature to
prevent this condition and allow feasible repairs to take place.
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If a BRU failure occurs, ac power for NaK pump operation is provided from backup sources
to permit decay heat removal. In many cases one of the standby BRU's would be started (a
matter of minutes) to assume the load.
2. 7. 4 SHUTDOWN AND RESTART
The Brayton unit can be shut down by removing gas from the loop until the unit falls below
self-sustaining speed. Supplemental bearing feed gas is required at speeds below 4, 000 rpm.
During this time the reactor can be maintained at a low power level at operating temperature
or shut down. Normal shutdown of the reactor is accomplished by a reverse command which
causes the control drums to step outward at the 3-second rate.
2.8 REFERENCES
2-1 "Space Base Concept Data - Space Base Subsystem Requirements, " Volume m, MDC-
G0576, McDonnell Douglas, June 1970.
2-2 "Reactor Power System Design Document - Appendices," Volume n, MDC-G0750,
McDonnell Douglas, December 1970.
2-3 "Preliminary Reference Design Document - Reactor," Volume n, MDC-G0744,
McDonnell Douglas, January 1971.
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REACTOR DISPOSAL SYSTEM
3.1 DESCRIPTION
A reactor disposal system is an integral part of the lower radiator structure of the reactor
power module. The system was developed from a conceptual design study (Reference 3-1)
conducted to identify key engineering elements involved in the synthesis of nuclear electric
power system disposal techniques.
The Reactor Disposal System, shown in Figure 3-1, is divided into the following subsystems:
• Structural and Passive Temperature Control
• Separation
• Reaction Control System
• Main Propulsion
• Guidance and Control
• Electrical Power
• Tracking Transponder
• Telecommunications and On-Board Checkout
The structural system provides for the docking and release mechanism, umbilical connections,
and related Space Base-Electrical Power System interfaces. A passive control system, con-
sisting of multilayer superinsulation and small, strategically located heaters, is used to pro-
tect various system components from large temperature variations of +158 K to +397 K
(-175°F to +255°F).
Springs similar to those used on the APOLLO-LM program are used to separate the reactor
power module from the Space Base and provide a AV of about 0.39 m/sec (1.13 ft/sec).
A cold gas Reaction Control System (RCS) is used for spin stabilization of the power module.
The components within this subsystem include two pitch jets, two yaw jets and four roll jets.
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The location of the RCS engines is shown in Figure 3-1. A schematic of the RCS is shown
in Figure 3-2.
Four Thlokol 442-1 solid propellant motors are used for the primary propulsion system with
a total AV capability of 254im/sec (837 ft/sec). Each of the four rocket motors must per-
form properly in order to attain the desired final circular orbit. Failure of one or more of
the rocket engines will leave the payload in either an elliptical or in a circular orbit at lower
than the desired altitude.
The Guidance and Control (G&C) subsystem performs the following functions:
• Pre-checkout
• Attitude reference alignment
• Attitude stabilization following separation and thrusting
• Pitch and yaw attitude maneuvers
• Attitude hold
• Firing of main motors
• Attitude control during thrusting
Specific components within the subsystem include:
Gyros Jet Logic
Horizon Sensors Torquing/Heaters
Sun Sensor Sensor Interfaces
Sequence/Timer Power/Signal Conditioning
-All-of-the-electronics -required~for the~G"&C~equipm"ent~are~con"tained~fn the~ Cornmand7" Control
and Sequences (CC&S) package. This package is hermetically sealed and pressured to pro-
tect its electrical circuitry from contamination. The major functions of the CC&S package
is to:
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Figure 3-2. Stored Cold Gas Reaction Control System
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. • Provide sequence and logic
• Attitude control
• Power supplies
• Telemetry, checkout and alignment interfaces
It is assumed that initial disposal alignment can be provided by the Space Base; however,
independent alignment by the Reactor Disposal System after separation from the Space Base
is also considered a prime mode.
Two remotely activated silver-zinc batteries will supply electrical power for the Power
Module (PM). Each battery has a capacity of approximately 1,200 watt-hours and is rated
at 40 ampere-hours; the batteries are connected in parallel for supplying all PM subsystem
electrical load requirements during disposal. Power diodes provide for electrical isolation
of one battery from the other in the event that both batteries become connected to a common
power distribution bus or to a common electrical load. This configuration and battery rating
allows either battery to be used to supply the worst case power requirements shown in
Figure 3-3.
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Figure 3-3. Power Profile for PM Disposal (Worst Case)
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A transponder will be used to track the PM after it is released from the Space Base. The
spent PM can be tracked during all disposal phases by the ground tracking network.
An on-board checkout system is incorporated into the Reactor Disposal System providing
communication either with the Space Base or ground tracking stations via a telemetry system.
The Reactor Disposal System can be checked out periodically by means of the on-board
checkout system and the telemetry system. This will be accomplished by initiating an RF
command signal from the Space Base to the PM and interrogating the PM. The return sig-
nal can be transmitted through a hardwired umbilical system. Interrogation by RF provides
another means for total system checkout. Post separation communication with the PM can
be performed by the Space Base and/or ground tracking stations via the telemetry system.
Maximum battery time which will allow telemetry communications is five hours.
The on-board checkout system will provide signals to the receiver verifying a "go, no-go"
status for each phase of disposal. The telemetry system combined with the on-board check-
out system will provide necessary data to the controllers on which to base their decisions to
continue or discontinue the next phase of the disposal operation.
3.2 REFERENCES
3-1 "Post Operational Safety of Reactor Power System for NASA Space Station," Volume V,
AI-AEC-MEMO-12917; Atomics International, North American Rockwell, June 1970.
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SPACE BASE
A baseline Space Base configuration was established from recent studies performed for
NASA by North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas (Reference 4-1 and 4-2). The
baseline provides a reference design against which results of the study can be compared and
evaluated in the future.
The Space Base consists of: (1) the zero-g core modules; (2) a series of artificial-g modules
attached at a 30 m (approximately 100 ft) radius from a rotating hub; (3) detached and attached
experiment modules; (4) two ZrH Brayton cycle reactor power modules suspended on booms
some 60 m (200 ft) from the basic core modules. An artist concept of the reference Space
Base is shown in Figure 4-1.
Basic elements of the design are common modules 10 m (33 ft) in diameter which make up
the main living and work areas. When built up by a series of Saturn and Space Shuttle launches,
capability of supporting a 50-man crew for a 10-year mission exists. Projected lifetime of
the reactor power modules is 5 years. Therefore, reactor Power Module (PM) repair, re-
placement and disposal are required during and at the end of the mission.
The primary logistic and operational support vehicles are the Space Shuttle and Space Tug.
Docking of the PM units to the Base is assumed to be accomplished with the Space Tug.
During normal operations the two reactor PM units will provide a maximum of 100 kWe
conditioned power. It is assumed that a single PM could provide the total load for short
periods during shutdown or failure of the other PM. Backup power of approximately 16 kWe
is provided by a solar array.
REFERENCES
4-1. "Space Base Concept Data, " Volume I-VIII, MDC-G0576, McDonnell Douglas, June 1970.
4-2. "Space Base Definition, " Volume I-III, MSC-00721 (SD7 0-160), North American
Rockwell, July 1970.
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LAUNCH VEHICLE
The baseline vehicle employed to launch the reactor power modules is the INT-21, which
is a Saturn V derivative using the existing S-IC and S-n stages. Figure 5-1 shows the
baseline vehicle outline and payload shape. The salient characteristics of the S-IC and S-n
stages are shown in Figure 5-2.
5.1 S-IC STAGE
The S-IC stage is a cylindrical booster, 42 m. (138 ft) long and 10 m (33 ft) in diameter,
powered by five liquid propellant F-l rocket engines using LOX/RF as propellants. These
engines develop a nominal sea level thru:
a maximum burn time of 168.0 seconds.
7
st of 3.42 x 10 newtons (7,610 klb) total, and have
The S-IC stage provides first stage boost of the INT-21 launch vehicle to an attitude of about
60 km (approximately 200 kft), and provides acceleration to increase the vehicle inertial
velocity to 2752 m/sec (9, 029 ft/sec). It then separates from the S-II stage and falls to
earth about 665 km (360 nm) downrange.
The S-IC first stage is of double tank aluminum skin-stringer-frame construction. The
2219-T87 tanks are joined by a 7075-T6 Al corrugated, ring-stiffened interstage. The
forward and aft skirt are 7075-T6 Al skin cylinders with stringer and ring frame stiffening.
The heavier LOX is placed forward of the lighter RF (RP-1) for smaller control moment
requirements. Four fins are used for increased abort stability and are mounted on the out-
board engine fairing as are eight retro rockets for staging.
5.2 S-n STAGE
The S-II stage provides second stage boost for the INT-21 launch vehicle. The stage is
24. 8 m (81.5 ft) long, 10 m (33 ft) in diameter, and is powered by five liquid propellant
f>
J-2 rocket engines which together develop, a nominal vacuum thrust of 5.1 x 10 newtons
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Figure 5-1. INT-21 Launch Vehicle and Payload Configuration
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MAJOR COMPONENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
•• 17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
S-IC Characteristics
FORWARD SKIRT STRUCTURE
GOX DISTRIBUTOR
LOX TANK
ANTI-SLOSH BAFFLES
ANTI-VORTEX DEVICE
CRUCIFORM BAFFLE
INTERTANK STRUCTURE
FUEL TANK
SUCTION LINE TUNNELS
LOX SUCTION DUCTS
FUEL SUCTION DUCTS
CENTER ENGINE SUPPORT
THRUST COLUMN
HOLD DOWN POST
UPPER THRUST RING
LOWER THRUST RING
ENGINE FAIRING
FIN
F-l ENGINE
RETRO ROCKETS
GOX DUCT
HELIUM DUCT
HELIUM CONTAINER
HELIUM DISTRIBUTOR
LOX VENT DUCT
INSTRUMENTATION PANELS
CABLE TUNNEL
UMBILICAL PANEL
Length-m
Diameter-m
Dry mass-t
Liftoff mass-t
T/W ratio
Sea level thrust - Newtons
Sea level Isp-sec
Propellant consumed-t
Mass at staging-t
Maximum acceleratton-g
Maximum dynamic pressure-Newton/m^
Flight azimuth-deg
Main Propulsion Engines
Propellants
Mainstage Capacity-t (RF)
(LOX)
Separation System
42.1
10.0
135.4
2, 825. 3
1.222
3. 42 x 10?
264.5
2,075.8
168.1
4,535
31,848
46
5-F1
LOX & RF
642
1,442
Solid
(138 ft)
(33 ft)
(298.6klb)m
(6,229.7 klb)m
(7,610klb)f
(4,577klb)m
(370klbs)m
(665 Ib/ft2)
(l,416klbs)m
(3, 179 klbs)m
S|-n Characteristics
POS in
S-IC SATURN
BOOSTER
POS IV
Length-m
 ( 24. 8
Diameter -m
Dry mass-t
Liftoff mass-t
Thrust (VAC)-Newtons
Isp (VAC)
Propellant consumed-t
Mass at staging-t
Main Propulsion Engines
10.0
38.3
581.3
5.1x 106
429.2 max.
437.7
43.2
5-J2
Propellants LH2 & LOX
Mainstage Capacity-t (LH2) 71. 6
(LOX) 371. 4
Avionics-t | 3, g
Payload inserted t 86.2
Separation System 1 Solid
(81. 5 ft)
(33 ft)
(84. 5 klb)m
(1,281. 8klbs)m
(1, 150 klbs)f
(965. 2 klbs)m
(95. 2 klbs)m
(158 klbs)m
(819 klbs)m
(8 klbs)m
(190 klbs)m
Figure 5-2. S-IC and S-II Stages
Characteristic Summary
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(1,150 klb). The four outer J-2 engines, equally spaced on a 5. 33 m (17. 5 ft) diameter
circle,are capable of being gimbaled through a plus or minus 7.0 degree pattern for thrust
vector control. The fifth engine is mounted on the stage centerline and is fixed.
At engine cutoff the S-II stage separates from the power module and, following a suborbital
path, reenters, the atmosphere where it disintegrates due to reentry loads. The S-II second
stage is a combined tank with a 2014 Al and fiberglass phenolic honeycomb common bulkhead
between the LOX and LH tanks. The tanks are 2014 Al alloy, integrally-stiffened skin
£i
cylinders with ellipsoidal bulkheads. The forward and aft skirts are 7075 Al alloy skin-
stringer-frame construction.
5.3 INSTRUMENT UNIT
The launch vehicle is guided from its launch pad into earth orbit by navigation, guidance
and control equipment located in the Instrument Unit (IU). The IU is a cylindrical structure
located between the S-n stage and the power module. An all-inertial system, using a space
stabilized platform for acceleration and attitude measurements, is utilized. A Launch
Vehicle Digital Computer (LVDC) is used to solve guidance equations and a flight control
computer (analog) is used for the flight control functions. In addition, the IU contains tele-
metry and tracking systems.
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SECTION 6
LAUNCH AND MISSION SUPPORT
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
The principle reference launch and mission support facilities for the Space Base and its
reactor power modules are the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Range Safety, Ground
Tracking Networks, Recovery Forces and the Mission Control at MSC. An overall view of
the launch area at KSC and surrounding facilities is shown in Figure 6-1.
As in the present Apollo program, the center of activity is Launch Complex 39 (Figure 6-2).
The major facilities at KSC and tentative additions required to accommodate the Space Base
power module launches include:
Existing (some modifications required)
• Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB)
• Mobile Launcher (ML)
• Crawler
• Launch Control Center (LCC)
• Launch Pad A and B
• Mobile Services Structure (MSS)
• Ordnance Storage Facility
Additions
• Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB)
• Liquid Metal Facility
• Transporter & Specialized GSE
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6.1 EXISTING FACILITIES
For the most part, the support of the reactor| Power Module (PM) can be accomplished by
planned modifications to existing facilities. Liquid metal fire fighting provisions must be
accommodated at the VAB, ML and Pad areas. The increased diameter of the PM payload
over the S-IV B will require modifications to the service arms and work platforms of the
ML, VAB and MSS. In addition, a protective cover gas capability is required at the pay-
load level of the ML to provide an inert atmosphere around hardware containing liquid metal.
Provisions will also be required for the addition of power module GSE in the ML, VAB, and in
the LCC. Other than the requirement for liquid metal fire suppression, the basic launch pad
should remain relatively unchanged.
6.2 ADDITIONAL FACILITIES
6.2.1 NUCLEAR ASSEMBLY BUILDING (NAB)
A new facility or modification to an existing isolated facility is required for the receiving
inspection, storage, checkout and assembly of the reactor PM units. This facility must be
capable of servicing and storing at least 3 PM units within a controlled access and controlled
environment in accordance with AEC, and NASA-KSC requirements.
6.2.2 LIQUID METAL FACILITY
The reactor PM units will be delivered to KSC completely loaded with NaK-78. Under normal
operating conditions NaK lines would not be opened. However, provisions must be available
for the safing of a system which has developed a leak either upon arrival at KSC or during
prelaunch operations. A minimum liquid metal handling facility is required which is capable
of unloading NaK from the system prior to shipment back to the factory.
_6.. 2..3._P_QWER_MQDyijETRANSPORTER 1
A PM transporter trailer will be provided for use from the point of assembly to the final
integration with the launch vehicle at KSC. This vehicle will: (1) provide environmental
and shock protection; (2) serve as the transport trailer in the aircraft or barge and at KSC;
(3) be capable for use as a storage facility. The transporter will include provisions for
6-4
supplying the cover gas, humidity control, fire fighting and status and radiation monitoring
equipment.
6.3 RANGE SAFETY
The INT-21 launch vehicle will have destruct systems on both the S-IC and S-II stages. The
S-n destruct system will be considered to be safed before Eurasian land mass overfly in
order to take advantage of any possible range extension. Before destruct command, a sig-
nal will be sent for engine cut-off which then arms the destruct system. Several data points
are used in reaching a decision to destruct such as: (1) the vehicle reaching a pre-established
limit line which is a function of the boost vehicle and payload; (2) vehicle loss of altitude, or
(3) vehicle loss of control. Reaction times for a range officer to initiate the destruct com-
mand are up to 20 seconds. The desirability of pre-separation of the PM prior to destruct
is questionable, due to the largeAV required to provide adequate separation distance within
the time provided for destruct. No credible jettison capability is assumed for the reference
vehicle and payload.
6.4 TRACKING AND DATA NETWORK
The communications and tracking network assumed for the reference vehicle, Space Base
and PM includes the Launch Control Center, Mission Control Center, Data Relay Satellite
System, and the telemetry and tracking capability of the Manned Space Flight Network.
Principal control through S-II cutoff and initial orbit insertion will be the responsibility of
NASA-KSC and its tracking stations. After orbit attainment control will rest with the Mission
Control Center (MCC) and the Space Base. It is assumed telemetry/status monitoring and
command control of the PM can be provided by both the Space Base and the MCC.
Space Base tracking and telemetry will be used to perform the reactor disposal operation.
The MCC will provide backup capability. The PM is tracked to a safe distance behind the
base, and after confirmation of stabilization and orientation, the command is given for thrust-
ing of the disposal rockets for placement into a transfer orbit. The PM is continually tracked
until the second command is given for final orbit circularization.
6-5
Tracking aid equipment and a transponder is placed on the PM to assist long range tracking
and computation of final orbit.
The present Manned Space Flight Network is not entirely adequate for the 55° inclination
orbit and the potential impact areas associated with the vehicles. The use of other facilities
and deployment of tracking ships could provide the supplementary tracking data required.
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SECTION 7
BASELINE MISSION
The reference mission used in this safety study is presented in this section and is briefly
summarized below.
The reactor power modules will be launched from Complex 39 at the John F. Kennedy
Space Center. The INT-21 launch vehicle will boost the power modules to rendezvous with
the awaiting orbiting Space Base. Space tugs will withdraw the reactor power modules from
the payload shroud, and dock them to the Space Base. After a brief checkout period, the
power modules will be brought to full power (330 kWt) and operated continuously for five
years. At this point, when the operational lifetime of the reactor is completed, each
reactor will be shut down, separated from the Base, and placed in a 990 kilometer (535
nautical mile) circular orbit to allow decay of the fission product inventory. The mission
phases for the Electrical Power System are shown in Figure 7-1 and are discussed in detail
in the following sections.
4.0 REACTOR DISPOSAL
« SEPARATION/STABILIZATION
• TRANSFER BURN
• COAST TO APOGEE
• CIRCULAREATION BURN
3.0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
• CHECK-OUT
• STAHT-UP
• OPERATION
• EMERGENCY OPERATION
2.0 LAUNCH/ASCENT
• LAUNCH
• S-IC BOOST
• S-n BOOST
• RENDEZVOUS & DOCKING
1.0 PRELAUNCH
TRANSPORTATION
RECEIPT, INSP. , STORAGE
CHECKOUT It ASSEMBLY
INTEGRATION 4 TEST
COUNTDOWN
Figure 7-1. Mission Phases (Reactor Power Module)
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7.1 MISSION SEQUENCE
7.1.1 PHASE 1. 0 PRELAUNCH\
The Prelaunch Phase is assumed to contain the following activities: (1) Transportation;
(2) Receipt, Inspection and Storage; (3) Prelaunch Checkout and Assembly; (4) Launch.
Vehicle/Payload Integration and Test; (5) Launch Complex/Range Integration and Test;
and, (6) Countdown.
7.1.1.1 Transportation
The transportation description of the Reactor Power Module (PM) at KSC is based on the
assumption that the PM will be shipped to KSC in a nearly completely assembled configu-
ration. All NaK loops will be filled before the final acceptance testing at the factory and
will remain filled throughout all subsequent operations. Separable sections of the radiator
and shield are only permitted if liquid metal lines are not broken. The PM would arrive
in an environmentally controlled shipping container which provides the proper monitoring
equipment and ensures a clean, dry atmosphere. Previous operation of the reactor was
limited to near zero power critical tests, therefore radiation levels around the reactor
would be very low.
The PM will be taken from the arriving airplane (or barge) by land transport to the Receipt
and Inspection area (Nuclear Assembly Building) which is presently an undefined facility
at KSC.
r
Three reactor PM units will be delivered, the third PM serving as the backup. Subsequent
PM units will be delivered to KSC to serve as replacements during the mission. The first
PM will be delivered approximately 90 days prior to launch, the second - 60 days, the
third - 45 days. Transportation at KSC_w^^^y truck/transporter', trailerJjetween .the.
port of arrival, and Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB), the VAB and/or Complex 39.
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7.1.1.2 Receipt. Inspection and Storage
The transporter and PM will receive a comprehensive receiving inspection for proper
configuration, visual damage and monitoring of instruments designed to record shock loads,
environmental conditions such as humidity, air chemical composition and radiation. The
transporter will be opened and an inspection made of the PM for visual damage, fluid leaks,
system integrity and electrical harness and umbilical connections. Provision is made for
the discharging and purging of the liquid metal systems such that if a leak were detected,
the system could be safed for shipment back to the factory. Reactor control safety devices
will be checked. Consideration is given to the use of the transporter during all phases of
inspection, checkout and storage providing a universal piece of hardware equipped with
proper status and safety instrumentation.
Storage of three PM units is to be provided with maximum storage times of at least one
year. In addition to the two PM units on the Space Base in orbit, a minimum of two replace-
ment PM units are stored in a ready condition during the operational mission. Routine air-
borne and surface radiation and contamination measurements are made while the hardware
is in storage. Periodic (180 days) power module verification checks are also made. Prepa-
ration for storage will involve enclosing the entire PM within the transporter under a pro-
tective cover of dry gas (argon or N ). Purging of the container is required whenever the
£
enclosure is opened. Therefore, status monitoring provisions will be made through the
container walls to enable periodic checkout without opening the enclosure.
7.1.1.3 Prelaunch Checkout
Prior to integration with the booster or placement in storage, a series of subsystem veri-
fication tests will be performed to assure the integrity and functional operation of the PM.
The nuclear facility utilized for storage would also serve as the checkout and assembly
area. Consideration is given to the performance of tests on the transporter in conjunction
with a series of semi-portable test equipment. Continuity tests will be given electrical
connections and harnesses. Pressure and leak tests will be made and the PM coolant sys-
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tern will be operated to verify functioning of the PCS, valves, TEM pumps, and liquid lines.
Minimum loop flow tests will be made which will require the use of strip heaters to provide
sufficient thermal energy for operation of the NaK pumps.
i
Individual reactor control drums will be checked to verify operation and response charac-
teristics and safing devices checked and installed. No criticality test is made. A PM
systems test will then be performed where booster and spacecraft interface electrical sig-
nals can be sent, received and sequenced for prelaunch and in-flight simulation. Mechani-
cal and electrical interfaces will be checked to ensure compatibility with the launch vehicles
and spacecraft. Booster interface rings and shrouds are used to check for mechanical inter-
face conformance. As in the case of all subsequent tests, nuclear safety regulations are
to be followed. Materials and personnel within the prescribed test areas must be controlled.
Actual testing within the facility will comprise a minimum of ten days. After prelaunch
tests the PM will be prepared for transportation to the VAB or Mobile Launcher (ML) for
integration with the launch vehicle or put in interim storage. This operation includes the
addition of the j module radiator I shrouds and the installation of special instrumentation
safing and ordnance devices.
7.1.1.4 Launch Vehicle and Payload Integration and Test
The nature of the launch vehicle integration tests to be performed are dependent on the
selection of the launch vehicle and facility safety constraints. The reference baseline
launch vehicle is the INT-21. The possibilities exist of integrating the power module within '
the VAB or performing all integration tests at the Launch Pad Complex 39. In either case,
the PM should be scheduled as late in the sequence as possible. For purposes of the safety
analysis, integration of the PM units within the VAB is assumed. Launch vehicle integration
involves the mating of the hardware and the performance of those interface and combined
systems-tests to assure~launch~readines~s;^CbTOtdbv^ and
certain post-launch conditions are simulated such as PM separation, umbilical disconnect
and instrumentation and power transfers.
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Initial mating/loading checks with the booster and the handling devices will be performed
utilizing a dummy payload. Electrical and mechanical interfaces are simulated. A simulated
systems launch readiness and countdown test is performed in this configuration to insure
compatibility of instrumentation, environmental and support systems. A continuous and
comprehensive systems status check and flight readiness test is performed prior to the
ignition sequences and liftoff. For purposes of the safety study, it is assumed that either
a single or a dual reactor launch can be performed.
7.1.1.5 Launch Complex/Range Integration and Test
At approximately T-8 days the Space Vehicle complete with Reactor PM(s) is delivered
to Launch Complex 39 via the Mobile Launch Crawler. The shroud is maintained in position
around the PM at all times. PM instrumentation monitored includes umbilical and separa-
tion circuit connections, radioactivity, environmental conditions and control circuit continu-
ity. Telemetry radio frequency interference and range verification tests are made. Simu-
lated countdown, propellant loading, and pressure tests are made.
7.1.1.6 Countdown
The countdown is initiated on the INT-21 at T-2 days where flight readiness and functional
checks are given major subsystems. Special cryogenic and spacecraft fuel tanks are loaded.
Ordnance (including disposal rockets) are installed (T-15 to T-10 hours) prior to launch
vehicle cryogenic loading. Pad accessibility is very much limited at this point. Continuous
monitoring of systems is provided throughout the final phases of the countdown. The terminal
countdown is initiated at T-l hour with the completion of all flight readiness checks and the
propellant loading sequences. An automatic sequence for the start of the engines is initiated
at T-187 seconds. Swing arms are around the vehicles until the automatic sequence is
initiated, however, the removal of some upper service arms would be permissible at an
earlier hour to afford abort potential. This phase terminates with ignition of the S-IC
booster engines.
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7.1. 2 PHASE 2. 0 LAUNCH AND ASCENT
The INT-21 launch vehicle will be used to boost the reactor PM(s) to orbit from Launch
Complex 39. Two reactor power modules can be launched by one INT-21 booster. A de-
tailed description of the vehicle and complex facilities is presented in Sections 5 and 6.
The reactors are dormant during the launch and ascent phases. However, a small amount
of power may be supplied from a temporary source to provide a minimum flow of NaK in
the primary, intermediate and heat rejection loops. This flow prevents localized freezing
of the NaK during ascent and prior to reactor startup.
The Space Base Mission requires insertion of the payload into a 500 km (273 nm) circular
orbit inclined 55 degrees to the earth equatorial plane. The launch azimuth for this orbit
is 46 degrees, measured east of north, as a result of current range safety requirements
at the Eastern Test Range (ETR). This azimuth is not compatible with the desired orbit
inclination; therefore, a plane change of 6-degrees (S-n stage yaw) is employed when the
impact points pass Newfoundland, providng a new azimuth of ~ 40 .
The INT-21 flight sequence is shown in Table 7-1 i(Reference 7-1 and 7-2). At first motion
the launch vehicle begins a rise of 138 meters to clear the launch umbilical tower. Follow-
ing tower clearance a pitch program induces a turning rate on the launch vehicle. The pitch
program continues until 41 seconds after first motion. At this time the launch vehicle
begins a gravity-tilt profile which continues until tilt arrest at 153 seconds after first motion.
Tilt arrest is maintained during S-IC/S-II staging and continues through the remainder of the
atmospheric portion of flight.
JThes payloa.d_enclpsure__(shroud)^is_jettisoned-195-seconds after first motion^ —Atmospheric
flight is terminated approximately four seconds later. Vacuum flight and the Iterative
Guidance Mode (IGM) are initiated at 199 seconds with the IGM providing both pitch and yaw
steering commands during the remainder of the ascent to orbit.
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Table 7-1. Sequence of Events for Typical
INT-21 Launch from KSC
55 Inclination
456 Kilometer Altitude
Seq. No.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Event
Ignition
Lift-Off
Initiate Tiltover
End Tiltover- Begin Gravity Turn
S-IC Center- Engine Cutoff (CECO)
S-IC Burnout
S-IC-SII Separation
S-II Ignition
Interstage Jettison
Shroud Jettison
S-II-CECO
Guidance Cutoff
Orbit Insertion
Time
Max Payload
-9
0
11
41
139
157
159
161
189
195
458
547
557
Sec)
86t Payload
-9
0
12
35
149
161
163
165
193
544
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Time histories of inertial velocity, altitude,
and inertial flight-path angle during the boost
to orbit are presented in Figures 7-2 through
7-4. A summary of critical flight parameters
is given in Table 7-2.
It is assumed that the launch vehicle propul-
sion module, which contains the IU, incorpo-
rates features which allow rendezvous with
the orbiting Space Base. It is also assumed
that a "Space Tug" will withdraw the reactor
PM from the payload shroud, and perform
docking operations with the Base. Maximum
closing velocities are not to exceed about
1. 5 m/sec (5 ft/sec).
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Figure 7-3. Altitude History During
Boost to Orbit
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Figure 7-2. Inertial Velocity History
During Boost to Orbit
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Figure 7-4. Inertial Flight Path Angle
History During Boost to Orbit
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Table 7-2. , Critical Flight Parameter Summary
Parameter
Maximum Aerodynamic Axial Force - Newton
2
Maximum Dynamic Pressure - Newton/m
Maximum Longitudinal Acceleration - g's
Aerodynamic Heating Indicator (AHI) at
S-IC/S-II Separation - Newton/m (radiated area)
Dynamic Pressure at S-IC/S-II
Separation - Newton/m2
Dynamic Pressure at S-IC/S-II
Forward Interstage Drop - Newton/m
Dynamic Pressure at Payload
Enclosure Jettison - Newton/m
Time
(Sec)
68
74
139
159
159
189
195
Parameter
Value
1.36x 106
33,543
4.39
5.32 x 108
8
0.02
0.01
7.1.3 PHASE 3.0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
Docking of the PM with the Base will be followed by a manual IVA (2-man operation) connec-
tion of the electrical and control circuits at the boom interface. The PM circuits are then
monitored in the control room and continuity checks are made. PM systems are activated
with auxiliary power. PM systems functional tests are made and instrumentation systems
are verified operable. Control system operation is verified, and interlocks (if provided)
are removed to allow control drums to assume pre-startup positions. Functional tests of
the power distribution and conditioning systems are performed with auxiliary power. These
PM readiness tests should require less than four hours for each reactor and would be per-
formed from the control module. When readiness is achieved, the PM booms are extended
into the normal operating position.
7-9
The initial start-up of the individual nuclear PM units will be performed immediately after
checkout and communications tests. The startup sequence is performed after the booms
have been extended with the thermal shrouds around the radiator. The automatic sequence
is initiated from the control room with the sending of the reactor coded and sequenced start
command. A controlled speed stepping sequence individually single steps the drums in
sequential order. As criticality approaches, as planned into the program, the stepping
speed is reduced; the reactor brought slowly through criticality and up to operating tempera-
ture and power, as described in Section 2. Current operating conditions are controlled by
temperature measurements of the working fluid. The reactor is not designed to be load
following. It will operate at the designated 330 kWt condition regardless of the electrical
power drain. Power for these start-up operations comes from the Space Base auxiliary
power system. The thermal shroud is incrementally retracted as fluid temperature is at-
tained. The entire start-up sequence requires about 4 hours, with an additional 4 hours
allocated for system stability. Start-up of both reactors can be accomplished within a 12-
hour period.
Switch-over from auxiliary to reactor power will allow the reactors to assume the electrical
load of the Space Base and the initiation of additional experimental activities. Roll-up of
the solar array power system is accomplished after stabilization is achieved. Full power
operation of over 50 kWe is not required immediately but is built up as the Base is ex-
panded. (Power requirements are increased from approximately 40 kWe initially to a
nominal 100 kWe when fully operational capability is achieved. During this entire time
period, each reactor is operating at 330 kWt; however adjustments in the gas management
system can be made for long off-power operations. During normal operations, only limited
monitoring of the PM is required which can be done from the base or the MCC. These
operations can be performed periodically or on command by an onboard checkout and moni-
^toring-system;—A-degree-of-fault-isolation-will-be-providedvia-instrumentation-to-enable-the—
crew to rapidly diagnose and correct the situation. The most important function of the on-
board systems is to monitor life and mission-critical functions continuously to provide
advanced warning and allow for maintenance preparations. Immediate and in some
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instances automatic corrective actions such as PM shutdown should also be provided if
conditions arise which cannot wait for crew intervention.
Planned PM shutdowns require several steps including the activation of the back-up
solar array power system. The shutdown commands to the reactor cause the control drums
to step outward at the 3-second stepping rate. The neutron radiation drops to about 1
percent in 3 minutes at this rate and in about an hour, the reactor coolant temperature
will have dropped to below 425 K (300 F). The reactor n
repositioned around the radiator to prevent NaK freezing.
radiator thermal shrouds are then
7.1.4 PHASE 4. 0 REACTOR PM DISPOSAL
At the end of the normal lifetime of the reactor or after any accident which permanently
or severely damages the reactor or power conversion system, the PM will be boosted
to a 990 km (535 nm) disposal altitude where the fission product inventories will be allowed
to decay to acceptable levels over a minimum 250 year long-life orbit prior to eventual re-
entry. A complete description of the reactor disposal system is given in Section 3.
Figure 7-5 illustrates the maneuver used to place the reactor power module in the disposal
orbit. Figure 7-6 shows the nominal sequence of events required for checkout, separation,
and orbit transfer. The on-board checkout system will provide confirmation of reactor
shutdown and system status. The PM is then separated from the Base at approximately
0.6m/sec (2 ft/sec) by a spring-eject system. The PM guidance and control system i
will orient the vehicle for the rocket burn. When the preselected separation distance of
several kilometers is attained, the rockets are fired by remote control from the Base, the
MCC providing a backup capability. The reliability of subsystem components for successful
completion of the disposal operations is as follows (Reference 7-1):
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Structural and Passive Temperature Control
Separation
Reaction Control System
Main Propulsion*
Guidance and Control
Electrical Power
Tracking Transponder
Telecommunications and Checkout
*(for 3 of 4 engines; one engine
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Figure 7-5. Orbital Transfer Maneuver
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARY SELECTION OF THE REACTOR
ORBIT DISPOSAL ALTITUDE
The reactor disposal altitude was not specified and it was therefore necessary to select a
desirable disposal altitude for purposes of the study. However, it immediately became
apparent that the altitude would have a significant effect on the radiological risk to the public,
and that the selection of a safe reactor disposal altitude should be based primarily on ter-
restrial safety considerations in order to minimize this risk. The risk to the public arises
from a variety of potential accident situations which could occur during the disposal phase
of the mission and lead to premature reentry of the nuclear system. The degree of risk
incurred will be a function of fission product inventory, component reliabilities, and the
orbit life time.
A.I APPROACH
Normally, the propulsion system AV requirements are established by the desired disposal
altitude and the transfer maneuver. However, all four rocket motors in the baseline pro-
pulsion system must function normally in order to achieve the desired orbit. If any of the
motors fail to fire, the reactor will be left in a lower energy orbit than desired, generally
elliptical, resulting in premature* reentry. The hazard, or risk, to the populace will depend
upon the orbit lifetime, hence orbital characteristics of the reactor. Thus, it is desirable
to size the propulsion system such that credible aborts during the disposal sequences result
in "safe" or at least "acceptable" reactor orbits.
Various combinations of rocket motor failures were identified and calculations were performed
to determine the resulting orbits and reentry decay times. These calculations were repeated
for the various size disposal packages illustrated in Table A-l. This table shows the
propulsion requirements for various disposal altitudes, assuming a Hohmann transfer from
a base in a 500 kilometer orbit.
*Here, "premature" means any reentry other than decay from the nominal disposal orbit.
A-l
Table A-l. Disposal Package Velocity Requirements
Desired
Disposal
Altitude
km
648
694
740
833
926
1019
1111
1204
1296
nm
350
375
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
AV1
m/sec
39
51
64
88
112
137
159
182
204
AV2
m/sec
39
51
63
87
110
133
155
177
198
Total
m/sec
78
102
127
175
222
270
314
359
402
Conditions
• Hohmann transfer from 500 km (273 nm)
• AV- = burn for transfer
• AVo = burn for circularization
The orbits and decay reentry times for various combinations of engine failures are shown
in Table A-2. The decay reentry calculations were performed for two reentry configurations:
(1) the entire reactor power module, which includes the radiator, propulsion systems, etc.
2 2(£ = 1915 Newton/m , 40 Ib/ft ); and (2) the reactor with shield configuration 03 = 16, 858
2 2Newton/m , 352 Ib/ft ). For example, assuming the propulsion system is sized to place
Jhe_react_or_PM_in__aj)26jem(5J)Ojm)j3rbit^J3ien Table A-2 shows that if two motors
fire at transfer (AV = 112 m/sec, 367 ft/sec), and then one motor fails at apogee (AV =
J. • ^ -
1/2 x 110 = 55 m/sec = 181 ft/sec), the reactor will be left in a 926 x 713 km elliptical
orbit. The decay time of the PM configuration will be 73 years, and for the reactor/shield
configuration the decay time will be about 646 years.
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From inspection of Table A-2 it is obvious that for a given reentry configuration the abort
reentry time varies considerably, depending upon the specific failure postulated. In some
cases the reentry time is very short. In order to select the propulsion system requirements,
it is necessary to first determine (1) an acceptable decay time for the fission products, and
(2) the credible accidents to be protected against. From a preliminary analysis of the re-
actor fission product decay, it was determined that approximately 100 years of fission pro-
duct decay will reduce the risk to the general public to negligible levels.
Since aborts are random in nature, the probability of each accident must be considered.
Assuming that risk is proportional to decay time, then the disposal sequence can be made
safer by increasing the average abort decay time to 100 years. That is,
r P. • Y.
Y = 1 l-
where
Y = average decay time (years)
Y. = decay time resulting from accident (i)
P. = probability of accident (i)
P = total abort probability
The summation is over all accidents.
Calculations were made to determine Y for each of the ten disposal cases in Table A-2. Since
the reliability for one rocket motor is 0. 997993, it follows that the
probability that both FIRE = R = 0. 995990 (SUCCESS)
probability that both FAIL = (1 - R^2 = 4. 03 x 10~
-3probability that ONE FAILS = 2 R^^ (1 - RI) = 4. 01 x 10
A sample calculation for Case 7 is shown in Figure A-l. The average decay time as a
A-4
0>f-t
a
A-5
function of disposal orbit is shown in
Figure A-2, where it can be seen that a
disposal orbit of 990 kilometers yields an
average decay time of 100 years. This
altitude (990 km) then is the minimum dis-
posal altitude required to minimize risk
and has therefore been selected as the
reference altitude for this study. A sum-
mary of the key parameters for the reactor
disposal sequence is shown in Table A-3.
u 150
B
H
J I J I
700 600 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 KM
400 500 600 700 NM
DESIRED DISPOSAL ORBIT
Figure A-2. Average Abort Decay Time as
as Function of Desired
Disposal Altitude
Table A-3. Summary of Key Parameters for Reactor Disposal Sequence
• Reactor Disposal Altitude
• Minimum Orbit Decay Time from 990 km
• AV Required: (From 500 km to 990 km)
First Burn
Second Burn
Total
• Propulsion System Probabilities
That 2 of 2 Fire
TTint 9 nf 9 "Fail •--
That 1 of 2 Fail
990 km (535 nm), Circular
1167 Years
129 m/sec
126 m/sec
255 m/sec
0. 995990
4.- rn- V~TO •
4.01 x 10~3
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A. 2 MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE ORBITAL DISPOSAL ALTITUDE ANALYSIS
Perhaps the one assumption which has the greatest effect on the analysis is the model used
for the calculation of the time required for decay from earth orbit. There appear to be
many models available, some accounting for variations in solar activity, and some not.
It was not possible for this study to determine the most appropriate model; hence, the most
conservative was selected. This has the effect of overestimating the required disposal
altitude and underestimating the orbital decay times.
The second most important assumption is that a fission product decay time of 100 years,
following reactor shutdown, will reduce the risk to the general public to acceptable levels.
This, however, is a simplifying assumption and should be replaced by a detailed radiological
risk assessment.
Only rocket motor failures have been considered in this analysis, which is believed
sufficient for a preliminary orbit estimate. To refine the calculation, subsequent iterations
should be carried out using the detailed mission abort sequence trees.
It has been assumed in the analysis that the propulsion system consist of two groups of
rocket motors, with two motors in each group (4 motors total). It is further assumed that
if one rocket motor fails, a motor from the other group cannot be cut in to take over the
functions of the failed motor. This was mainly a simplifying assumption, but other design
concepts could be investigated by the same techniques discussed herein, if desired.
It is assumed that the disposal vehicle is sufficiently spin stabilized to allow asymmetrical
burns of the rocket motors.
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APPENDIX B
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTIONS
Many of the systems and components which comprise the Space Base Program are only
defined to a Phase A level of detail. Without a complete detailed description of all system
components it is difficult to adequately define those accident situations which involve the
interaction of various complex pieces of equipment. Functional descriptions of the most
important systems in the Program were therefore prepared in order to reveal system
interfaces which have a direct bearing on nuclear safety. Where appropriate, accidents
have been described in terms of equipment functions which are lost. The following sys-
tems were analyzed:
Space Base (Reactor Power Module);
1. Electrical Power System (EPS)
2. Electrical Power Distribution System (some components could be located within the
Space Base modules)
3. Reactor Disposal System
INT-21 Launch Vehicle
1. S-IC Stage
2. S-II Stage
3. Instrument Unit/Propulsion Module
A complete summary of the components and their principal functions is given in Table B-l.
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CONVERSION FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temperature
Volume
International
Units English Units
m/sec ft/sec
2 2
m ft
2in
Kg/m2 lb/ft3
lb/in3
Joule Btu
Newton Ibf
m ft
nm
Kg Ibm
watt Btu/ sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Newton/m2 Atmosphere
lbf/in2
lbf/ft2
m/sec ft/sec (fps)
K F
m3 in3
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
3.281
10.764
1550.39
6.242 x 10~2
3.610 x 10~5
9.479 x 10"4
2.248x KT1
3.281
5.399x 10~4
2.205
9.488x 10"4
5.691 x 10"2
3.413
3.413
1.451 x 10"4
2.088xlO~2
3.281
(9/5 -459.67/tK)
6.097 x 104
ft* 35.335
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Criticality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probability
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed.Material
Dose Guidelines
Dosimetry
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or imminent
degradation or failure of hardware. (In the safety analysis, no distinction Is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which may or may not result from a system failure or mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and partlculates released to the air.
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
internal pressures.
Radiation causing atomic displacement in semiconductor devices - sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage.
A condition where a radioactive material is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe.
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor. (As used in safety analysis results in a reactor excursion.)
The act of increasing the density of the core which results in increased reactivity and possible
criticality.
A gas blanket used to provide an inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations.
12An event having a relative or. cumulative probability of occurence of > 10 .
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction.
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain criticality.
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of "relative probabilities" of the individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree).
Same aa "Breached".
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc. (e.g., washing, filtering, chipping).
An excursion (safety analysis assumes ~ 100 MW-sec) accompanied by a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
particulars.
Nuclear hardware (e.g., reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a critical mass.
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware.
_The.spread.of-nuclear-fueI-and-radioactive-debris-on-the-earth's-surface-following-impacfor
destructive excursion.
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety analysis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries.
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation.
II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion
Exposure Limit
Fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burial
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard Source
Immediate Reentry
Impact in Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
Impact in Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
Intact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
Interfacing Vehicle
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment signal-to-nolse ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality.
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime.
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power. The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System.
Generally associated with the termination of the mission or flight. Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after intended lifetime.
A rapid and usually unplanned increase in thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor.
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula-
tory agencies or limits which preclude equipment damage.
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nuclide such
as U-235 or Pu-239.
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioisotopes in a heat source used in producing energy.
A shaped body of nuclear fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source. Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation.
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere.
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil.
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components.
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout.
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result in harm or
damage to personnel and equipment.
The location and/or origin of the hazard.
Very early reentry of the reactor (e.g:, misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting in 1-2 day reentry).
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material on the Continental Shelf or in a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely.
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion.
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation.
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an interaction
with the Manned Space Base.
Ill
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
lonlzatlon Damage
Land Impact
Loss of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non-credible
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Poison
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-poison
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological Consequences
Radiological Hazards
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
Radiation causing surface damage In materials (e.g., the fogging of film).
Nuclear hardware which Impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early in the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident.
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases.
. Material used In a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron capture: Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors In a thermal reactor.
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid.
Represents no hazard to the general populace.
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurrence of < 10
not worthy of concern.
-12 Considered
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact.
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events.
Immersion of reactor in an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion.
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor criticality under all foreseeable circumstances.
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a reactor.
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base.
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude.
A poison which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reactlcity. Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison".
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with the fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay. Commonly associated with an excursion event.
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub-
critical due to water surging in and out of the core.
The radiation exposure effect on personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event.
Hazards associated with radiaUgn.as ditfe^rentiated_frgm^jther_spurces_.
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
in a given mission or phase thereof.
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit.
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super-critical and negative values to reactors which are sub-critical. (Usually ex-
pressed In multiples of a dollar.)
IV
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Reactor Fails to Survive Reentry
Reactor Survives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative Probability
Repair/Replacement
Ruptured
Safety
Safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere.
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating; radiation shield may be damaged.
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield.
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices.
Consists of (a) physically repairing all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s).
Same as "Breached".
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property.
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple injuries to personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or.component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any injury to
personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury (SPD-1A).
A separate, possibly automatic, mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program.
All aspects of the Space Base mission including all prime and support hardware and personnel
both on the ground, at sea or in orbit, which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space; these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit. A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first
stage thrust.
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode.
Material in which isotopes of an element may be incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical, biological or physical process.
V/VI
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